*完成訂單後正常情形下約兩周可抵台。 *本賣場提供之資訊僅供參考,以到貨標的為正確資訊。 印行年月:202309*若逾兩年請先於私訊洽詢存貨情況,謝謝。 台灣(台北市)在地出版社,每筆交易均開具統一發票,祝您中獎最高1000萬元。 書名:無線網絡的博弈論與機器學習 (英文) ISBN:9787519296766 出版社:世界圖書出版公司 著編譯者:薩姆森.拉索爾斯 叢書名:世界博弈論經典 頁數:323 所在地:中國大陸 *此為代購商品 書號:1583405 可大量預訂,請先連絡。 內容簡介 近年來,無人機(UAVs)已被用於建築、商業交付、軍事和民用戰區等領域。隨著應用的增加,對資源分配和能源管理的高級演算法的需求也隨之增加。眾所周知,博弈論和機器學習是已經廣泛應用於無線通信領域的兩個強有力的工具,關於博弈論和機器學習在無線通信中的應用有很多研究。然而,現有的調查都集中在博弈論或機器學習,由於這一事實,目前的文章研究了在無線通信網路(U—WCNs)無人機中使用的博弈論和機器學習演算法。本文還討論了如何將博弈論和機器學習相結合來解決U—WCNs中的問題,並確定了未來的研究方向。目錄 PrefacePART I FUNDAMENTALS OF GAME THEORY CHAPTER 1 A Very Short Tour of Game Theory 1 1 Introduction 1 2 A Better Understanding of the Need for Game Theory from Four Simple Examples 1 3 Representations and Classification of Games 1 3 1 Representations of a Game 1 3 2 Classification of Games 1 4 Some Fundamental Notions of Game Theory 1 4 1 Actions, Pure Strategies, Mixed Strategies 1 4 2 Dominant Strategies, Rationality, Pareto-Dominance, Best-Response Correspondence 1 4 3 Nash Equilibrium, Dominant Strategy Equilibrium Correlated Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium 1 4 4 Ilustration of Some Concepts 1 5 More about the Scope of Game Theory 1 5 1 About Rationality 1 5 2 About Selfishness 1 5 3 About Interaction 1 5 4 About the Solution Concepts CHAPTER 2 Playing with Equilibria in Wireless Non-Cooperative Games 2 1 Introduction 2 2 Equilibrium Existence 2 2 1 Better-Reply Secure and Quasi-Concave Games 2 2 2 Continuous Quasi-Concave Games 2 2 3 Potential Games 2 2 4 S-Modular Games 2 2 5 Recursive Diagonally Transferable Continuous Games 2 2 6 Existence of Mixed Nash Equilibria 2 2 7 A Note on the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games 2 2 8 Other Classes of Games Possessing at Least one Pure Nash Equilibrium 2 3 Equilibrium Uniqueness 2 3 1 The Best Responses Do Not Need to be Explicated 2 3 2 When the Best Responses Can be Explicated 2 4 Equilibrium Selection 2 4 1 Equilibrium Selection in Concave Games 2 4 2 The Role of Dynamics in Equilibrium Selection 2 4 3 Additional Comments 2 5 Equilibrium Efficiency 2 5 1 Measuring Equilibrium Efficiency 2 5 2 Improving Equilibrium Efficiency 2 6 Conclusion CHAPTER 3 Moving from Static to Dynamic Games 3 1 Introduction 3 1 1 Informal Definition of a Dynamic Game 3 1 2 Classifying Dynamic Games 3 2 Repeated Games 3 2 1 Introduction 3 2 2 Fundamental Notions of Repeated Games 3 2 3 Equilibria in Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring 3 2 4 Beyond the Perfect Monitoring Assumption 3 3 Stochastic Games 3 3 1 Stochastic Games with a Common State 3 3 2 Stochastic Games with Individual States 3 4 Difference Games and Differential Games 3 4 1 Difference Games with a Common State 3 4 2 Differential Games with a Common State 3 5 Evolutionary Games 3 5 1 Dynamic Procedures vs Perfect Anticipation 3 5 2 Pairwise Interaction Model 3 5 3 Generic Formulation of Population Games 3 5 4 Evolutionary Game Dynamics 3 5 5 Price of Anarchy in Evolutionary Games 3 5 6 Applying Evolutionary Games to the Medium Access Control Problem PART II GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND LEARNING CHAPTER 4 Bayesian Games 4 1 Introduction 4 2 Bayesian Games in a Nutshell 4 2 1 The Harsanyi Model 4 2 2 Bayesian Equilibrium 4 3 Application to Power Control Games 4 3 1 Bayesian Energy-Efficient Power Control Games 4 3 2 Bayesian Rate Efficient Power Allocation Games CHAPTER 5 Partially Distributed Learning Algorithms 5 1 Introduction 5 2 Best Response Dynamics 5 2 1 An Acyclic Graph Game has a Pure Equilibrium 5 2 2 Weakly Acyclic Games and BRD 5 3 Fictitious-Play-Based Algorithms 5 3 1 Brown's Fictitious Play Model 5 3 2 Other Versions of Fictitious Play 5 3 3 On the Convergence of Frequencies 5 3 4 Asynchronous Clocks in Stochastic Fictitious Play 5 3 5 Is Fictitious Play Applicable in Wireless Games 5 4 Learning Logit Equilibria 5 4 1 Information-Theoretic Interpretation of Boltzmann-Gibbs Rule 5 5 Games with Cost 詳細資料或其他書籍請至台灣高等教育出版社查詢,查後請於PChome商店街私訊告知ISBN或書號,我們即儘速上架。 |